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A UNIFIED TREATMENT OF HORIZONTAL
DIRECT INVESTMENT, VERTICAL DIRECT
INVESTMENT, AND THE PATTERN OF
TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES
ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to research endogenizing multinational firms in general-equilibrium
trade models. We attempt to integrate separate contributions on horizontal multinationals which
produce the same final product in multiple locations, with work on vertical multinationals, which
geographically fragment production by stages. Previously derived results now emerge as special
cases of a more general model. Vertical multinationals dominate when countries are very different
in relative factor endowments. Horizontal multinationals dominate when the countries are similar
in size and in relative endowments, and trade costs are moderate to high. In some cases, foreign
investment or trade liberalization leads to a reversal in the direction of trade. Investment
liberalization can also lead to an increase in the volume of trade and produces a strong tendency
toward factor-price equalization. Thus direct investment can be a complement to trade in both a




















Boulder, CO 803091. Introduction
The theory of the multinational enterprise has traditionally been rather disjoint from the
theory of international trade. International trade theory developed from a general-equilibrium
tradition, usually relying on the twin assumptions of constant return to scale and perfect competition
in production. The theory of the multinational enterprise has tended to be a branch of a more
general theory of the firm, focussing on individual firms and their incentives to internally integrate
activities across geographic space.
During the last fifteen years, the theory of international trade has broadened considerably,
incorporating models based on increasing returns, imperfect competition, and in some case product
differentiation. But the treatment of individual firms remains limited, generally detached both from
the theory of the multinational enterprise and empirical evidence. Firms are modelled as single-plant,
single-product organizations with all equity concentrated in the country of (single-plant) production.
Yet industries with strong scale economies and oligopolistic market structures are often dominated
by multinationals.
More recently, there have been attempts to endogenize multinational firms into general-
equilibrium trade models. Firm-level characteristics combine with country-level characteristic and
trade wsts to determine what types of firms exist in equilibrium. Yet the various papers are limited
in generality, in part due to severe technical challenges. Perhaps the most difficult of these is that
characterizing the types of firms in existence as a function of parameter values is inherently an
exercise in comparative statics on inequalities. Second, the dimensionality of even a minimal partial-
equilibrium model is large when their are alternative configurations of firms and plants.
Two branches of literature in particular remain separate. In one, multinationals are multi-
plant firms producing roughly the same product in different locations, substituting international
production for trade (Markusen, 1984). These models of “horizontal” multinationals are particularly
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relevant empirically for investment among the developed economies. In the second branch,
multinationals are firms that separate activities geographically with investment leading to intra-firm
trade (Helpman, 1984). These models of “vertical” direct investment seem more relevant to
investments into developing economies, a category which has been historically small but which has
grown substantially during the last five years.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated treatment of these models, so that
various combinations of vertical multinationals, horizontal multinationals, and strictly national firms
can arise endogenously as a function of parameter values. The parameters in question are trade
costs, differences between countries in relative and in absolute factor endowments, and investment
barriers. me horizontal model of Markusen, with generalizations by Horstmann and Markusen
(1992), Brainard (1993), and Markusen and Venables (1995, 1996a,b) emerges as a special case as
does the vertical model of Helpman, with extensions by Helpman and Krugman (1985), Konan (1996)
and Zhang (1996).
The model begins in a traditional fashion with two countria, two goods, and two factors. One
sector has increasing returns both at the firm (e.g., R&D) and the plant level. Trade costs may exist
between countries. The increasing-returns indust~ has six possible firm “types”, with the types of
firms active in equilibrium denoted a “production regime”. There are two types of single-plant
national firms (type-n firms), one for each country. These firm locate their “headquarters” activities
in the same country as their single plant. Vertical multinationals (type-v firms) locate their
headquarters and single plant in different countries as in Helpman’s original model. Horizontal
multinationals are two-plant firms, with their headquarters in one country. The two types each of
vertical and horizontal multinationals are subscripted by country, in each case the country in which
their headquarters activities are located. Headquarters activities (firm-level fixed costs) use only
skilled labor, plant f~ed costs use a combination of skilled and unskilled labor, and final production3
requires only unskilled labor. 1
We show that vertical multinationals dominate production when the countries differ
significantly in relative factor endowments, but are somewhat similar in size. Horizontal
multinationals dominate when the countries are similar in both size and in relative endowments, and
when trade costs are moderate to high. National firms dominate (a) when trade costs are low and
relative endowments are similar or, (b) when trade costs are moderate, relative endowments are
similar, and the countri= differ significantly in size.
The “trade regime” (the direction of imports and exports), is of considerable interest in that
it can differ substantially from standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory and its trade-industrial-organization
extensions (e.g., Helpman and Krugman). While the increasing returns sector (X) is assumed skilled-
labor intensive overall relative to the competitive sector (Y), multinationals can unbundle this sector
into separate activities, one of which is more skilled-labor intensive than Y (headquarters) and one
of which is less skilled-labor intensive (final production). If differences in relative endowments are
moderate, then the skilled-labor-abundant country exports X. But if the relative endowment
difference is large, type-v firms enter, fragment the X sector, mncentrating headquarters activities
in the skilled-labor-abundant country and production in the unskilled-labor abundant country. This
reverses the direetion of trade, with the skilled-labor-abundant country importing X.
The ratio of sales by affiliates of multinationals to the sum of trade flows and affiliate sales
is of some interest. If trade costs are low, this ratio is highest when the muntries differ significantly
in relative endowment but are of similar size (type-v firms dominate). If trade costi are high, the
ratio is highest when the countries are similar in both relative endowments and size (type-m firms
lHorizontal multinationals do have a verticat component to them, in that the headquarters services are
supplied to the foreign branch plant. This is surelytrue of all multinationals:there are serviceflowswithin the
firm. Our distinction between verticalmultinationals and horizontal multinationals is in a sense simplyone of
deftition. The form is a “vertical”relationshipin the sense that servicesflowin one direction and final output
in the other. There is no intra-fum trade in goods in the case of our horizontal f~ms.dominate).
We then inquire into the effects of multinationals by comparing an unrestricted equilibrium
to one in which multinationals are banned by assumption. Results include the following. First,
investment liberalization can, in some cases, reverse the direction of trade and/or increase the volume
of trade. Second, investment liberalization (like trade liberalization in more traditional models)
produces a strong tendency toward factor-price equalization. Thus direct investment and trade can
be complements in both a volume-of-trade sense and in a welfare sense.
Throughout the paper, we will try to indicate the empirical relevance of certain situations and
the potentially testable predictions generated by the model.2. Model Structure
The model has two countries (h and f) producing two homogeneous goods, Y and X. There
are two factors of production, L (unskilled labor), and S (skilled labor). L and S are mobile between
industries but internationally immobile. Y will be used as numeraire throughout the paper. Skilled
labor is used for the Grin-specific f~ed cost of producing X, and plant-specific f~ed wsts use a
combination of the two labor types. Unskilled labor is used in variable rests, and in addition there
are transport nsts between countries, specified as units of unskilled labor per unit of X exported.
Subscripts (i)j) will be used to denote the countries (f,h). The output of Y in country i is a
CES function, identical in both countries. The production function for Y is
(1)
where LiYand SiY are the unskilled and skilled labor used in the Y sector in country i. The elasticity
of substitution (1/(1-•)) is set at 5.0 in the simulation runs reported later in the paper.
Superscripts (n,v,m) will be used to daignate a variable as referring to national firms, vertical
multinationals, and horizontal multinational firms respectively. (mi , vi , n i ) will also be used to
indicate the number of active m, v, and n firms based in country i. Hopefully, it will always be clear
from the context what is being represented (e.g., ni as a variable in an equation always refers to the
number of national firms in country i).
The quantification of fwed costs in the X sector is of considerable importance in this model.
Notation is as follows, with F’s denoting skilled-labor requirements and G’s denoting unskilled-labor
requirements.
F; Skilled labor requirements of a type-n firm drawn from headquarters’ country







Skilled labor requirements of a type-m firm drawn from headquarters’ country
Skilled labor requirements of a type-v firm drawn from non-headquarters’ country
Skilled labor requirements of a type-m firm drawn from non-headquarters’ country
Unskilled labor requirements for a type-n firm drawn from headquarters’ count~ (where the
plant is located).
Unskilled labor requirements for a type-n firm drawn from the non-headquarters’ country
(where the plant is located).
Unskilled labor requirements for a type-m firm, which must be incurred in each country (one
G“ for each plant).
Several assumptions guide us in specifying the relative values of freed-cost parameters.
(a) Skilled labor need in f~ed costs should be the same for both type-n and type-v single-
plant firms (F; = F;+ F). But type-v firms will need to draw some of this skilled labor from the
country in which the plant is located (F; > O). For type-n firms, all of these skilled labor
requirements will be drawn from the headquarters’ country.
(b) Skilled labor needed in fwed costs for type-m firms should be higher than the amount
required for single-plant type-n and type-v firms, but much less than double the amount (2F~ > F?
+ F; > F). This latter assumption reflects the joint-input nature of knowledge capital. Type-m
firms require somewhat more skilled labor in the headquarters’ muntry (FT > F“ , reflecting
technology-transfer and other costs) and some skilled labor in the host country. 2
(c) Unsfilled labor requirements should be the same for all plants and should be drawn
entirely from the country in which a plant is located (Gm = Gn = G’).
(d) In order to prevent a degeneracy in the model and to account for the real possibility that
2Markusenand Venables (1995a,b)assume that rdlX-sectoractivitiesuse factors in the same proportion or
use just a single factor, Labor-market effects are only of second-order importance in those papers and not
addressed. Assumptions similar to the present ones are introducedin Markusen and Venables 1995c,but there
are no type-vfums. The technology-transfercost (F7 > F?) is motivated by empiricalresults, especiallythose
of Teece (1977,1986),that direct investmentsrequire si~lcant further investments in skilled-labor-intensive
activitiesfor multinational fums,7
there is some cost to separating plant and headquarters, we assume that all fwed costs for a type-v
firm are 1% higher than the f~ed costs for a type-n firm (F;+ F;= 1.01“F:, G’= l.Ol*Gn ).3
Using these principles as guidelines, the values used in the simulations throughout the paper
are as follows.
Nation Firms Headquartered in Country i:
F;= 1.0 G“ = 1.0
Horizontal Multinationals Headquartered in tiuntry i:
F? = 1.1 F;= 0.1 Gm = 1.0 (one Gm required for each plant)
Vertical Multinationals Headquartered in Country i:
F;= 0.909 F;= 0.101 G’= 1.01
Marginal factor requirements are constant in units of unskilled labor. 4 X~jdenotes the sales
in country j of a national firm based in country i. Let wi, and zi, denote the prices of unskilled labor
and skilled labor respectively in country i. A national firm undertakes all its production in its base
country, so the cost function of one national firm in country i is given by
(2) wiLi” + ZiSin = Wi[cxl: + (c + T)xun + G“] + Zi~:, i,j = h,f, i*j.
where c is the constant marginal production cost. c, Fn ~, and G nare identical across countries. r is
the amount of unskilled labor needed to transport one unit of X from country i to country j, which
3Consideran equilibriumwithat least one type-n~f~m and at least one type-~ firm. Ifwe did not havethis
cost penalty these two fums could be exchanged for one type-v~ f~m and one type-vf firm and we would still
have an equilibrium (total factor demands in each country are unchanged, etc.). Thus the equilibrium is
degenerate. Our assumption of the l~o cost penalty seems very realistic, and avoids this technical problem.
4We assume that sktied workers cannot be used in X production (e.g., “unskilled workers” actually have
manual/mechanical skiUs that cannot be used in R&D, and vice versa for the skiUs of “skilled workers”). We
could assume that skilled workers have the same productivity in X as unskitled workers, effectively binding the
skilled-uskilled wage ratio to a lower bound of 1. This would add 12more inequalities to the model. In the
parameterization we use, sucha lowerbound is almostneverbinding,exceptwhenmtitinationals are prohibited
(usedfor compwison purposes), in whichcasethe ratio islessthan one in equilibriumin about 10%of the factor
box.8
we assume to be the same in both directions. In our calibration, national firms in the X sector are
moderately more skilled-labor intensive that Y-sector firms.
A horizontal multinational based in country i has sales in country j, X~j . It operates one
plant in each muntry incurring freed costs, (Gm, F~ ) in its base country, and fixed costs (Gm, F;
) in country j. Sales are met entirely from local production not trade. L~j (S~j ) denotes a country
i horizontal multinational firm’s demand for unskilled (skilled) labor in country j. A firm type mithus
has a cost function
(3) wiLtirn+ wjLtirn+ Zis,; + Zjsurn = Wi[cx,; + Gm] + Wj[cxym + G’”] + ZiF’lm + ZjF2m.
Similarly, a vertical multinational based in muntry i (plant in country j) has sales in country
j, Xyj. L~j (S~j) denotes a country i vertical multinational firm’s demand for unskilled (skilled) labor
in country j. A firm type vi hm
(4) wjL; + Zisi; + Zjs; =
a cost function
~j [cx~rn+ (C + 7)X’” + G‘] + Zi~lv + ZJF2V.
In our calibration, horizontal multinational firms are generally more skilled-labor intensive
than national and vertical multinational firms, using more skilled labor for branch-plant fixed rests
versus the additional unskilled labor for transport costs used by national or vertical firms. This
depends, however, on firm scale.
Let ~, and ~i denote the total labor endowments of country i. Adding labor demand from ni
national firms, vi and Vjvertical multinationals, and mi and mj horizontal multinationals gives count~
i factor market clearing:9
~ = Lb + niLin + miLi~ + mjLj~ + vjL~
(5)
In equilibrium, the X sector makes no profits so muntry i income, denoted Mi, is
(6) Mi = Wig + Vif i = h,f
pi denotes the price of X in muntry i, and XiCand YiCdenote the consumption of X and Y. Utility
of the representative consumer in each country is Cobb-Douglas,
(7) Ui = x; Y:- ‘,
giving demands
(8) Xk = a Mijpi, Yti = (1 -a)Mi.
Equilibrium in the X sector is determined by pricing equations (marginal revenue equals
marginal rest) and free-entry conditions. We denote proportional markups of price over marginal
cost by e~j , (k = n,m,v), SO, for example, e~i is the markup of a country j horizontal multinational
in market i. Pricing equations of national, horizontal, and vertical firms in each market are (written
in complementa~-slackness form with associated variables in brackets):
(9) Pi(l - e;) ~ ‘jc
(lo) Pj(l -e;) s Wi(c + t)
(11) pi(l - ei~) s Wic





(13) Pi(l - ej) ~ WiC (x;)
(14) Pi(l - e;) s Wj(C + T) (x;)
In a Cournot model with homogeneous products, the optimal markup formula is given by the
firm’s market share divided by the Marshallian price elasticity of demand in that market. In our
model, the price elasticity is one (see equation (8)), reducing the firm’s markup to its market share.
This gives, (also using demand equations (8)),
(15)
xi pjx;




There are six zero-profit wnditions corresponding to the numbers of the four firm types.














To summarize the X sector in the model, the twelve inequalities (9)-(14) are associated with
the twelve output levels (two each for six firm types), the twelve equations in (15) are associated with
the twelve markups, and the six inequalities in (16)-(21) are associated with the number of firms of11
each type. Additionally goods prices are given by (8), income levels from (6) and factor prices from
factor market clearing equation (5) together with labor demand from the Y sector.
The model is
of the model would
quite complex for two reasons. First, a bare-bones partial equilibrium version
involve 30 non-linear inequalities as just noted. Second, it is a problem of
comparative statics on inequalities, making traditional analytical, comparative-statics methods of
limited value. The problems introduced by inequalities are compounded by the factor that we have
five different production activities (Y, X-sector output, national-firm fixed costs, horizontal
multinational-firm fried costs, vertical
proportions. 5
multinational-firm fixed costs), all using factors in different
We did manage to make considerable analytical progress in two of our earlier papers,
Markusen and Venables (1995, 1996a,b). In the former we did this by examining a simplified partial
equilibrium model (a model of the model) and in the latter by adopting a monopolistic-competition
framework with f~ed markup rules, and only three firm types. In both models, production and all
fixed cost activities use factors in the same proportion and there are no vertical multinationals are
permitted. In the next section, we will try to gain some intuition by reviewing analytical results from
our earlier papers with appropriate extensions, and later in the paper simulate the full model which
involves 51 non-linear inequalities using Rutherford’s (1995) non-linear complementarily solver.
5Reviewing points made separately earlier, type-mfums are moderately more skilled-labor intensive than
type-vf~ms which are moderately more skilled-laborintensivethan national firms which are moderately more
skilled-labor-intensive than Y production in our calibrations. But many of the interestbg factor-mmket effects
that we identify are driven by geographical rearrangement of activities when multinationals are allowed to enter
rather than by the skilled-labor intensities of type-n or type-v fums versus type-m fums versus Y production per
se.12
3. General Discussion
A brief review of our earlier separate results maybe in order (Markusen and Venables, 1995,
1996a,b Konan, 1996, Zhang, 1996), along with some conjectures about how they will relate to one
another in a more general model. First, consider the basic determinants of the production regime,
defined as the set of firm types active in equilibrium. A basic feature of the model is that horizontal
multinationals have multi-plant economies of scale, in that the total freed costs for a two-plant firm
are less than double the f~ed costi for a one-plant firm. Given the parameterization of the model
noted above, at the equilibrium factor prims prevailing in free trade the f~ed costs of a type-m firm
are about 1.52 times the f~ed costs of a type-n or type-v firm. The latter are low freed-cost
organizations, but they must incur transport costs in serving a foreign market. The advantage of a
type-v firm over a type-n firm in turn lies in the possibility of international differences in factor prices:
large difference give the type-v firm an advantage in that it can locate each of its two activities in
different countries according to factor-price differences. The broad determinants of the equilibrium
production regime are as follows.
Production Re~ime
Type-m firms will tend to dominate when
Firm-level scale economies are high relative to plant-level scale economies
Total world demand is high
Trade costs are moderate to high
Countries are similar in relative factor endowmenk
Countries are similar in size.
TWe-n firms will tend to dominate when
Trade costs are low and countries are similar in relative endowments and si~
Trade costs are moderate and countries are ve~ different in size.
Type-v firms will tend to dominate when
Trade costs are moderate to low, and countries differ significantly in relative endowments.
Some of this is fairly obvious, but a few comments about the roles of relative endowments and
muntry sizes are appropriate. When trade barriers are moderate, type-m firms tend to have an13
advantage over type-n or type-v firm when the countries are similar in relative endowments and size.
Neither country has an advantage in terms of a single plant, and the added fixed costs of having two
plants outweighs the trade costs incurred by a one-plant firm. But if the muntries are very different,
then one of them has an advantage, either in terms of being a much larger market or in terms of
having factor prices that favor X sector production. Single-plant firms located in this advantaged
muntry then have an advantage over two-plant horizontal multinationals in that the latter must locate
costly capacity in a small and/or high-rest market. Thus the association of horizontal multinationals
with similar countries.
When single-plant firms dominate, the qumtion of type-n firms versus type-v firms turns on
factor-price equalization. If factor prices are roughly equalized with type-n firms dominating, then
type-v firms cannot enter. There is a cost penalty to splitting headquarters and plant, and no
offsetting advantage. When factor-prices are very different across the two countries, then there is
an advantage in splitting the two activities, with the headquarters in country with cheap skilled labor
and the plant in the country with cheap unskilled labor. Our conjecture is then that type-v firms
should be able to enter when the two countries are very different in relative endowments so that
factor prices are not equalized when only type-n firms produce. But differences in country sizes
should not support type-v firms in equilibrium.
In the earlier work of Markusen and Venable, the mmparison of horizontal multinationals
with national firms suggested that multinationals tend to reduce the volume of trade in goods as
exports of “producer services” (e.g., blueprints, managerial services) substitutes for trade in
commodities. The addition of type-v firms make that less clear, as articles by Konan and Zhang show.
Investment liberalization can lead to a reversal in the direction of trade as previously integrated firms,
for example, begin to export component and producer sefices and re-import a large share of finished
(assembled) products from a subsidia~ in a smaller, unskilled-labor abundant country. Similar14
circumstance might lead to an increase in the volume of trade following trade liberalization.
Another possibility that investment liberalization can increase the volume of trade lies in the
fact that, in the absence of multinationals, “comparative advantage” in X is determined by a
combination of country size and relative endowment factors. The country relatively well endowed
with skilled labor has a comparative advantage in X, but the larger of two countries also has such a
comparative advantage due to a “home market effect” familiar from the trade-industrial organization
literature. When a count~ is large, but scarce in skilled labor it may export X, but have a high price
for skilled labor constraining its specialization and exports. The entry of type-v firms in such a
situation basically relaxes this constraint by locating headquarters in the small, skilled-labor abundant
country thereby leading to an increase in the volume of trade.
There is an interesting question about the volume of sales by affiliates of multinationals
relative to trade, something that is amenable to empirical examination. Our model should predict that
this ratio is high under the circumstance outline above so that horizontal multinationals dominate in
equilibrium. But it may also be moderately high when vertical multinationals dominate in equilibrium.
Unfortunately, this leads to a less-than-sharp prediction. If trade costs are high, then affiliate
production relative to trade should be highest when the countries are similar in size and in relative
endowments (type-m firms dominate). If trade costs are low, then affiliates should have a high share
when the countries are very different in relative endowments (type-v firms dominate). These
conjectures are summarized as follows.
Trade Repime
The entry of multinationals (removal of an investment ban) may reverse the direction of trade in X
when the muntries differ significantly in relative endowments.
The entry of multinationals may increase the volume of trade when one country is larger but is
relative well endowed with umkilled labor.15
The ratio of affiliate sales to the volume of trade plus affiliate sales is high when (a) trade costs are
low and the muntries differ significantly in relative size, (b) trade barriers are moderate to high and
the countries are similar in both relative endowments and size.
Finally, there are interesting questions concerning how multinationals affect factor prices, a
subject we addressed in Markusen and Venables, 1996a. We noted that the ent~ of horizontal
multinationals generated a tendenq toward international factor-price equalization in almost all cases.
Those results should be reinforced herewith the addition of vertical multinationals. As noted above,
type-v firms in this model are creatures of situations where factor prices are unequal in their absence.
Allowing direct investment leads firms to fragment and rearrange X-sector activities, putting more
R&D in the skilled-labor-abundant country and more production in the unskilled-labor-abundant
country, thus moving the world toward factor-price equalization.
Factor-Pri= Equalization
The removal of investment barriers should generate a strong tendency toward factor-price
equalization.16
4. Production Regimes
Figure 1 shows simulation results for three alternative values of transport costs, T = .00, .05,
and .10. Each panel is an Edgeworth box with the total world endowment of unskilled labor on the
horizontal axis and the total world endowment of skilled labor on the vertical axis. The origin for
country h is at the southwest corner and the origin for country f at the northeast corner. These
diagrams will be familiar to most readers from the work of Dixit and Norman (1980) and the
adaptations to industrial-organization models by Helpman and Krugman (1985).
In the parameterization we use, the skilled-unskilled wage rate at the center point of the
factor box is very steep; although this wage ratio is about 1.4S though the center, there are actually
many more units of unskilled labor than skilled labor, so that geometrically the factor-price ratio is
very steep. The point of mentioning this is that country size effects are very important in this model
in some cases, and in effect country h is smaller (in total income) at all points left of column 10 and
larger at all points to the right of column 10 in all of the diagrams.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows a simplified regime diagram for the case of free trade
(complete characterizations are provided in an appendix). There is a central region in which only
national firms operate, flanked by areas in which there is a mixture of type-n and type-v firms. In
the northwest corner only type-v (v~ ) firms are active in equilibrium and similarly an area of only
type-v (v~) firms in the southeast corner. Obviously, these are regions in which only the unskilled-
Iabor-abundant country produces X while all headquarters are located in the skilled-labor abundant
country. b
Results here are reminismnt of Helpman (19W). As the countries become very different in
relative endowments, factor-price equalization fails to hold in the absence of multinationals, creating
%e might note that, because of the assumed cost penalty, type-vh and type-vf f~ms can never co-exist. One
each of these f~ms couldbe displaceby one each ofa type-nhand type-~ firms. The latter generate exactly the
same outputs and factor demands exceptfor havinga l~o lower freedcost.17
an opportunity for type-v firms to enter. The middle panel of Figure 1 shows similar results, with a
quantitative difference in that the region in which only national firms are active shrinks.
The bottom panel of Figure 1with T = .10 provides an integrated case that cannot be found
in previous writings (Zhang, 1996) suggests this in a partial-equilibrium model. All six firm types exist
in some region of the factor box (again, see the appendix for a complete characterization). In the
central region, type-m firms exist; only type-m firms exist in the core of this region while the outer
edges are generally a mixture of type-m and type-n firms. Horizontal multinationals exist when the
countries are relatively similar in size and in relative factor endowments, a point emphasized by
Markusen and Venables (1995, 1996a,b). 7
As the countries become increasing different in relative factor endowments, factor prices
become unequal, creating an opportunity for type-v firms to enter in the manner we have already
discussed. When countries differ in relative endowments but are also veq different in size, there is
a mixture of national and multinational firms (relevant to all three panels).
For example, near the lower left-hand edge of all three panels, types n~and v~firms exist in
equilibrium (see appendix). Country h is relatively well endowed with skilled labor making it suitable
for headquarters activities, but it is too small to support all such activity. Thus type n~firms exist as
well. All final production occurs in the large, unskilled-labor-abundant country. This case may be
relevant to some small, but skilled-labor abundant countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, and The
Netherlands. These countries are home to many multinationals, but much of their production occurs
abroad.
Zhang (1996) notes an interesting hypothesis that follows from these results: as a developing
country begins to catch up in both size and in relative endowments, we might see it first attract
‘Horizontal multinationals do not exist in the Helpman model because of the assumption of zero trade costs
throu@out. Vertical multinationals are not considered in the ori~al Markusen model and in the Markusen
and Venables papers.18
vertical investment, and later horizontal investment to service the local market. He maintains that
this process is indeed going on in China.Simplified Regime Diagramswith Transport Costs ~= .00, .05,.10
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5. Trade Regimes
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium trade regimes for transport costs T = .00, .05, and .10 in the
three panels corresponding to Figure 1. By “exports of S“,we are referring to services of skilled labor
embodied in the headquarters services supplied to foreign plants by multinationals (skilled labor in
not itself internationally mobile). Thus there are two traded goods in the model, X and Y, and a
traded service. If for example only type-v~ firms existed in equilibrium, then these firm are providing
headquarters services to country f in exchange for markup revenues which would likely be repatriated
in terms of X. Country h might either import or export Y, but statistics would show a net deficit for
country h in trade in goods only, the balancing item being the “invisible”service flow to foreign plants.
The top panel of Figure 2 (costless or free trade) shows that country h exports X for points
above, but not too far above the diagonal. This follows from the fact that the X sector overall is
skilled-labor-intensive relative to the Y sector. But when the difference in relative endowments
becomes large, factor-price equalization fails to hold and it bemmes profitable for type-v~ firms to
enter. These firms unbundle the X-sector activities into headquarters services (more skilled-labor-
intensive than Y) and final production (less skilled-labor-intensive than Y). In the northwest corner
area of Figure 2, country h then exports Y and S, and imports X.
The large unshaded region to the northwest of the center point in the middle panel in which
country h imports X and exports S and Y requires some explanation (types v~and n~firms are active
in equilibrium over most of this region). Some point in this region actually lie below the diagonal.
Driving this result is a country size effect, which will appear several times in our results. Two effects
drive “comparative advantage” in this model as we noted earlier: relative endowments and country
size. Due to the scale economies in X and the nature of markup determination, location in the larger
market is advantageous for a firm in the presence of trade costs, because most of the firm’s sales are
in its low-cost market. In the absence of multinationals, the larger country will be the headquarters20
country for most national firms (out of proportion to country size differences) and be the exporter
of X along the SW-NE diagonal of the factor box. But since the relative endowments of the two
countries are the same, this must in turn imply that the relative price of skilled labor is higher in the
large country. That in turn implies that if multinationals are permitted, type-v firms headquartered
in the small country will enter in equilibrium.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 adds a central region in which there is no trade in X (all X is
produced by type-m firms), with peripheral regions in which one country imports both X and Y in
exchange for exports of services. For example, in cell row 17 and column 8 in the lower panel, type
v~and m~firms exist in equilibrium (see appendix). All firms are headquartered in h and a very high
service export volume is matched by imports of both X and Y.
Some recent empirical evidence suggests that the volume of direct investment in the world
economy has been growing faster than the volume of trade, ~pecially among the developed countries,
over the last two dwades. There has been a large increase in the flow of direct investment from
developed to developing countries over the las five years, although the stock of direct investment in
developing countries remains fairly small.
Figure 3 considers the volume of sales by foreign affiliates of type-m and type-n firms divided
by that amount plus the total volume of trade in X and Y.8 It takes on a value of zero when there
are only type-n firm in existence and may have a value of one when there are only type-m firms. 9
When trade costs are low or zero, the statistic is small or zero near the center of the factor box and
when the countries differ in size but not in relative endowments (type-n firms dominate in these
%here are several alternative statistics which could be used. One is to consider ordy arm’s length trade in
X in the denominator, so that for example X export by type-vh fums from the plant in f to h are not counted.
We found no strong reason to prefer one statistic over another.
9Having ordy type-m firms is not sufficient for a value of one. If more of these firms are headquartered in
one country, that country will be a net exporter of S and a net importer of Y. Thus some commodity trade still
occurs in equilibrium.areas). But it can take
in relative endowments
21
on values in the .30-.50 range when the countries are significantly different
but similar in size (type-v firms dominate). Once again, this is the result of
unequal factor prim in spite of free trade that create opportunities for type-v firms.
As trade costs bemme higher in the bottom panel of Figure 3, the central region changes very
substantially with horizontal multinational firms replacing national firms. The statistic at and near the
center in fact jumps from zero to one. Now the affiliate sales ratio is highest when the countries are
similar in both size and in relative endowments. But it remains moderately high when the countries
are very different in relative endowments but similar in size, and near zero when the countries are
very different in size. This gives us some sharp empirical predictions, but unfortunately the affiliate
sales ratio between very similar countries is greatly sensitive to the level of trade costs.Figure 2: Trade Regime Diagramswith Transport Costs ~= .00, .05,.10
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6. Assessing the Effects of Multinationals by Counterfactual: Multinationals
Suppressed
While much has been written on the “effects on multinationals”, often it is not clear to what
multinationals are being mmpared. What is the munterfactual against which to judge these effects?
In our case, the most obvious alternative is to simply compute equilibria in which multinationals are
banned by assumption, thus suppressing type-v and type-m firms. Only types n~ and n~can exist in
equilibria, converting the model into a standard example of the “new trade theory”.
Figure 4 illustrates the trade regime for the three values of trade costs used in the preceding
figures, ~ = .00, .05, and .10. The striking feature of all three diagrams is the tension of relative
endowment versus country size in determining the direction of trade in X. Since X cannot be
fragmented, it isskilled-labor-intensive overall relative to Y, and so the skilled-labor-abundant country
tends to export X. But the X sector has increasing returns to scale and hence has this home-market
effect mentioned several times earlier. This gives the larger of two countries a “comparative
advantage” in X production and exports. 10
These effects come across quite clearly in all three panels of Figure 4. If auntry h is
relatively skilled-labor-abundant (points above the SW-NE diagonal),
“significantly” smaller, where the critical value of size decreases with
it exports X unless it is
the difference in relative
endowments. Converse comments apply to country f. Some non-monotonicity occurs in the top
panel (free trade) such as row 10. Moving from left to right, country h first imports X as the country-
side effect dominates, and then exports X as the relative-endowment effect dominates. Crossing the
diagonal the direction of trade reverses again (but this is the relative-endowment effect continuing
1°Recti that the factor-price ratio through the center point is very steep, so effectivelycountry h is larger
in income at all points to the right of column 10. If ~ country size mattered, the hatched area of country h
exporting X in Figure 4 would be all points in the right-hand half of the diagram. If only relative endowments
mattered, the hatched area would be all point above the SW-NE diagonal as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The
Helpman-Krugman (1985) reproduces the usual Heckscher-Ohlin result because, with freed markup rules, there
are no country size effects.23
to dominate) and eventually trade reverse a final time as the country-size effect once again dominates.
Figure 5 puts the information of Figura 2 and 4 together to produce maps of regions where
the direction of trade is reversed with the removal of the investment ban. In all three panels, trade
in X reverses direction in the northwest and southeast regions. Basically, this is intuitive in terms of
previous results. With multinationals banned, X sector production integrated in one location is
skilled-labor-intensive relative to Y production. Thus the skilled-labor abundant country exports X
as just noted. But factor-prices are unequal in these regions, with skilled labor being cheaper in the
skilled-labor-abundant country. Thus if multinationals can enter, type-v ~ firms will enter in the
northwest corner, fragment production, concentrating headquarters activities at home and locating
more unskilled-labor-intensive final production in country f.
The shaded regions of trade reversal in the top panel of Figure 5 are considerably harder to
understand, in part because our intuitive stories tend to follow partial-equilibrium reasoning.
Consider the shaded region in the southwest area of the top panel. Without multinationals, country
h imports X since the country-size effect dominates the relative-endowment effect as we noted
earlier. But muntry h also has a relatively low price for skilled labor in this region. Thus if
multinationals are permitted, type-v~firms willenter, relocating headquarters activities toward country
h. But this drives up the price of skilled labor in country h. In general-equilibrium, the solution is
to reallocate resources in country h, from the Y sector to final X production, the latter being less
skilled-labor intensive than Y. So invatment liberalization leads to a reallocation of resources to the
most skilled-labor-intensive activity (headquarters) and to the least skilled-labor-intensive activi~
(final production) and out of the intermediate activity Y. This reversal in the direction of trade in
X in this SW region does not occur in the bottom two panek of Figure 5 (increased trade costs affect
the direction of trade with multinationals (Figure 2), but not without (Figure 4) in this SW region).
Figure 6 plots results as to how the volume of mmmodity trade changes with investment24
liberalization, the hatched areas being regions of increased trade following investment liberalization.
Investment and trade in goods could be termed complements in a volume sense in these regions.
Roughly speaking, the results indicate that the investment liberalization increases the volume of trade
when the moderately skilled-labor abundant country is also moderately smaller.
These results are not easy to interpret. In each of the panels of Figure 6, some of the
hatched points of increased trade volume coincide with point of trade-direction reversal in Figure 5
while the majority do not. What is true is that all of the hatched points in all panels of Figure 6
involve mixed regimes type-n and type-v firms when multinationals are permitted. No points involve
type-v firms only (and obviously not type-n firms only).
The second interesting feature of these hatched point of increased trade volume is that almost
all of them involve essentially no change in the gross volume of X sector trade, indeed many involve
a small fall in this volume. What accounts for the increased trade volume is an increase in the net
volume of X sector trade and a rise in the volume of Y trade (note that net trade in X and trade in
Y need not be the same because of trade in services). Thus, while the gross volume of trade in X
is not increasing, there is a fall in intra-industry (cross-hauling) trade in X as countries become more
specialized. The country with the lower price for skilled labor in the absence of multinationals
bemmes more specialized in headquarters’ servi~s and less specialized in final production when
investment is liberalized. In the left-hand “blob” of hatched points in the middle panel of Figure 6
for example, country h becomes more specialized in Y and S and less specialized in X production
when investment is liberalized. At some of the upper points in this blob the direction of trade in X
is reversed, from exporting to importing X while in the lower point imports of Y are reinforced by
investment liberalization.
The only exception to this result is some points at the extreme right and left-hand edges of
the upper panel of Figure 6, where investment liberalization does lead to increased intra-industry25
trade in X, and to very little change in the net volume of trade in X. At the left-hand edge for
example, invatment liberalization leads to a switch in the direction of trade in X as we noted above,
with country h exporting X after liberalization (country h switches from being relatively specialized
in Y to being relatively specialized in headquarters services and final X production). This generates
more cross hauling of X with little increase in the net trade in X (just a reversal in direction).Figure 4: Trade Regime Diagrams, Multinationals Suppressed
oh’’’’’’’’9’0 “’2’’’ 4’’’ 6’’’’”
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7. Factor Prices and Welfare
Our final set of raults have to do with the effects of multinationals on factor prices and
welfare. Again, we will use the counterfactual of no multinationals permitted as a counterfactual
against which to wmpare the effects of direct investment.
Figures 7 through 9 present results on the ratio of the skilled to unskilled wage rate in
country h. The panels correspond to the trade costs T = .00, .05, and .10, and in each diagram the
top panel is for multinationals permitted and the bottom panel for multinationals banned. It is
immediately obvious that multinationals constitute an important force toward factor-price
equalization. In each diagram, most of the area in the top panel has a value of zfi~ of between 98%
and 102.0470 (inverse of 98Yo)of its value at the center point of the factor box. It is interesting to
note that the size of this region is not very sensitive to the level of trade costs.
The bottom panels in Figures 7-9 tell a rather different story. Factor prices diverge rather
sharply from the center point as muntries become different in relative endowments. The degree of
divergence again is not very sensitive to trade costs, except that the size of the 98Yo-102% region
bemmes very small with non-zero trade costs.
The diagrams suggest that investment liberalization generates a strong tendency toward factor-
price equalization regardless of whether the entering firms are type-v firms or type-m firms (central
region of Figure 9). We have already commented on the role of factor-price differences in inducing
entry of type-v firms. Briefly, unequal factor prices induce the entry of type-v firms, which fragment
the X sector, locating skilled-labor-intensive headquarters activities in the country where S is cheap
(generally the skilled-labor-abundant country) and final production where L is cheap. This then
creates a pressure toward factor-price equalization. In the case of type-m firms, they do something
similar. Since there is only one headquarters, the potential type-m firm chooses the country in which
skilled labor is cheaper. In general equilibrium, this creates a similar pressure toward factor-price27
equalization.
Our final results in Figure 10 plot areas in which the removal of a prohibitive investment ban
11 Using good Y as numeraire and setting might lead to a fall in welfare (hatched areas).
expenditure shares equal to 1/2 as in our simulations, the indirect utility function for country h is
Thus changes in welfare can arise either from factor-price changes or a change in the price of X.
Although
points in
the general-equilibrium effects do not permit a very simple answer, most of the hatched
Figure 10 are associated with a rise in p, for country h following the removal of an
investment ban. In the hatched areas in the upper left-hand corners, recall that the direction of trade
actually reverses following investment liberalization, with country h having to import X from country
f. In the hatched regions on the far right, the removal of the investment ban is associated with a
transfer of production of X from country h to country f in most but not all of the hatched cells. We
think that this is interpreted as a loss of home-market advantage for country h, with an associated
loss of X production and rise in price. In any case, it is possible for invatment liberalization to leave
a country worse off if it is (a) small but very well endowed with skilled labor, or (b) large and
somewhat abundant in unskilled labor.
llWe have tried to avoid putting any emphasis on quantitative results in this paper. Since this is a pure
simtiation model, numericaJ values seem to have no particular interpretation. We break the silence here and
note that in ahnost all of the hatched points of Figure 10, the welfare loss following trade liberalization is less
than 1%.—. -—. a- . . . . . -. . . . -----
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8, Summa~ and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated treatment of a number of strand of
literature in which one sector of the economy produces with increases returns to scale and imperfect
competition. One branch is often referred to as the “new trade theory” in which single-plant national
firms compete with national firms of another country in the international market place. A second
branch involves endogenous “horizontal” multinational firms which choose between serving a foreign
market by exports and serving it by building a branch plant. A third branch involves “vertical”
multinationals which maintain single plants, but which geographically separate headquarters activity
from production. In the present paper, all of these models arise as special cases for some set of
parameter values.
(1) Our first task was to characterize the production regime: the types of firms active in
equilibrium. Broadly speaking, single-plant national firms (with headquarters and the plant in the
same location) dominate in equilibrium when the countries are similar in relative endowments and
dissimilar in size. They can also arise when sizes are similar provided trade costs are low. Vertical
multinationals (one plant with headquarters and plant in different countries) dominate when the
countries are sufficiently dissimilar in relative endowments but somewhat similar in size. Two-plant
horizontal multinationals dominate when the countries are similar in size and in relative endowments,
and trade costs are moderate to high.
(2) We then examined the trade regime: which countries export X, Y, and services. Here
the assumptions on factor intensities are crucial. Integrated production of X is more skilled-labor-
intensive than Y but decomposing X, headquarters activities use only skilled labor and final X
production is less skilled-labor-intensive than Y. Results indicate that the skilled-labor-abundant
country is like to import X (vertical multinationals headquartered in that country dominate) when the
countries are different in relative endowments but not extremely different in size.29
(3) An interesting statistic which is often cited empirically (although measured in a variety
of ways) is the ratio of sales by affiliate of multinationals to that amount plus the volume of
commodity trade. Our results indicate that this ratio is moderately high when the countries differ
significantly in relative endowments (vertical multinationals dominate). It is very high if trade costs
are moderate to high and the countries are similar in both relative endowments and size (but zero
under the latter circumstance if trade costs are zero).
(4) We introduced an explicit munter-factual against which to judge the effects of
multinationals by running the model with multinationals suppressed (e.g., a prohibitive investment
ban). Several interesting results follow. First, over a considerable subset of the parameter space
examined, the removal on an investment ban reverses the direction of trade in X. The multinational’s
ability to fragment production into skilled-labor-intensive and unskilled-labor-intensive activit ies often
means, for example, that the skilled-labor-abundant country switches from exporting to importing X
(but exporting headquarters services) following the removal of a ban.
Investment liberalization can also lead to an increase in the volume of trade. In most
instances when this happens, it appears to be driven by increased specialization within the X sector
and a fall in intra-industry trade in X. So, for example, the skilled-labor-abundant country may
concentrate on headquarters activities following investment liberalization and the other country
concentrate more on final production. While the total trade in X may not change at all, net trade
increases and so the balancing volume of trade in Y increases.
(5) A final section of the paper considered factor prices and welfare, again using the counter-
factual of an investment ban as a standard for comparison. We showed that investment liberalization
created a strong tendency toward factor-price equalization at all levels of trade costs. The overall
welfare effects of investment liberalization for a country are more complex and puzzling. Cases
where a country loses from liberalization are generally associated with the country having high levels30
of X production and exports without multinationals, but having that advantage eroded following
investment liberalization. This is consistent with established understanding about “home market
advantages” in scale-intensive industries.
(6) A a final comment, we might point out how fragile the “strategic-trade-policy” literature
looks in light of our results. That literature focusses on cases of single-plant, domestically-owned
brrns competing against like firms from the other country. This type of situation does exist in our
model, but over a very small part of parameter space (whatever that might measure). And of course,
it is clear that small changes in trade costs or other policy parameters might induce a regime shift,
so that the policy prescription based on an exogenous regime may be completely inappropriate.31
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